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Abstract 
 
 
A principal assumption in the epistemology of disagreement is that we, as rational subjects, assess 
evidence neutrally in order to justify our beliefs. However, the existence of the phenomenon of Belief 
Polarization threatens the validity of this basis. Since its introduction into philosophical discussion in 
Thomas Kelly’s paper titled, Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization, the phenomenon of 
Belief Polarization has been thoughtlessly overlooked. Given serious consideration, there seem to be 
widespread epistemological implications due to the existence of Belief Polarization. Specifically, Belief 
Polarization brings to light significant claims about the nature of justification and belief forming 
processes, specifically concerning evidence gathering. As this paper will argue, given awareness of 
Belief Polarization, rational subjects should be less confident in their justification of belief forming 
processes. In other words, rational subjects should not be fully confident in the objectively based truth-
value of their beliefs.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A principal assumption in the epistemology of disagreement is that we, as rational 
subjects, assess evidence neutrally in order to justify our beliefs.1 However, the 
existence of the phenomenon of Belief Polarization threatens the validity of this basis. 
Since its introduction into philosophical discussion in Thomas Kelly’s paper titled, 
Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization, the phenomenon of Belief 
Polarization has been thoughtlessly overlooked. Given serious consideration, there 
                                                          
1 Although it is agreed that certain factors, like presentation and kind of evidence, may initially 
predicate our beliefs, there seems to be an understanding that these factors should not affect our 
over-all assessment of our evidence or deliberately bias our beliefs and evidence gathering 
processes. See White, R. (Forthcoming) “You just believe that because…” Philosophical 
Perspectives. 
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seem to be widespread epistemological implications due to the existence of Belief 
Polarization. Specifically, Belief Polarization brings to light significant claims about 
the nature of justification and belief forming processes, specifically concerning 
evidence gathering. As this paper will argue, given awareness of Belief Polarization, 
rational subjects should be less confident in their justification of belief forming 
processes. In other words, rational subjects should not be fully confident in the 
objectively based truth-value of their beliefs.  
 
Belief Polarization is the phenomenon that explains the seemingly unnatural process 
whereby, given a mixed body of evidence, two equally rational subjects2 tend to 
become increasingly divided towards their own prior beliefs. To illustrate Belief 
Polarization, Kelly, in his paper Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization 
presents a scenario in which two rational subjects are in disagreement over whether 
capital punishment is a deterrent to crime or not.3 In the example, after becoming aware 
of each other’s view, both subjects are presented with the same substantial body of 
evidence that is “of mixed character: some studies seem to suggest that capital 
punishment is a deterrent while other studies seem to suggest that it is not.”4 Now the 
question is posed, “what becomes of our initial disagreement once we are exposed to 
such evidence?”5 It would seem natural that these two subjects would equally assess the 
evidence and possibly come to some sort of agreement or suspension of their prior 
beliefs, or at least, “one would expect that exposure to common evidence would not 
increase the extent of [their] disagreement.”6 However, these inclinations turn out to be 
false, as shown by experiments testing this phenomenon.7 For, as Kelly describes: 
 
Exposure to evidence of a mixed character does not typically narrow the gap 
between those who hold opposed views at the outset. Indeed… exposure to such 
evidence tends to make initial disagreements more pronounced…As our shared 
evidence increases, each of us tends to harden in his or her opinion, and the gulf 
between us widens. Our attitudes become increasingly polarized. 
 
Thus, the phenomenon of Belief Polarization explains why, when given more evidence, 
disagreeing rational subjects tend to become more confident in their original beliefs8 
                                                          
2 Gutting, Kelly, and others use the term ‘rational peers’, that is, for all intents and purposes, 
analogous to the use of ‘equally rational’ or ‘rational subjects’ in this paper. For more, see Kelly, 
T. (2005), “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 
Volume 1, J. Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3. 
3 Kelly, T. (2005), “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization,” Princeton University, 
page 1. 
4 Ibid. 1. 
5 Ibid. 1. 
6 Ibid. 2. 
7 Ibid. 2. 
8 ‘Original beliefs’ refers to beliefs that are held about ideas/theories prior to gaining evidence. 
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rather than coming closer to agreement. Furthermore, it seems that Belief Polarization 
brings to light processes that go against our natural intuition.   
 
It follows that the existence of Belief Polarization implies that prior beliefs tend to 
disproportionally affect the ways by which evidence is gathered. If this is so, then how 
pervasive is the effect of Belief Polarization and how does the existence of Belief 
Polarization affect current understandings of disagreement, namely Steadfast and 
Conciliatory views?  
 
 
II. Implications of Belief Polarization on Evidence Gathering Processes 
 
Three important ways by which, in accord with Belief Polarization, our prior beliefs 
can affect the way we gather evidence are as follows: we tend to scrutinize counter-
evidence too heavily, inappropriately assume truth-value to supporting evidence, or 
simply ignore evidence.  
 
The first two possible implications, of scrutinizing counter-evidence too much9 and 
assuming truth of supporting evidence, seem to lead to an inherent discrepancy in 
evidence gathering, tending to cause rational subjects to fail to uniformly substantiate 
evidence that they deem appropriate. Additionally, the possibility of ignoring evidence 
is, in itself, a self-defeating concept. Given, it would seem crazy for someone to take 
into account all possible evidence and not to ignore that which is irrelevant. For 
example, when getting to know someone it would seem excessive for you to suspend 
your beliefs about that person until you had done a full background check and received 
character evaluations from everyone that knows them. However, Belief Polarization 
seems to suggest that, due to our biases towards our original beliefs, we might blatantly 
ignore evidence that goes against those beliefs or acts as counter-evidence. However 
irrational these processes may seem, they might be more prevalent in our lives than we 
would like to think. Take for instance the resistance of Darwinism after the publication 
of Darwin’s Origin of Species, where educated and rational individuals were opposed to 
Darwin’s evidence.10 Furthermore, take into account the resistance to both Newton’s 
evidence for his theory of Gravity and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (even after his 
eclipse experiment that empirically justified his evidence).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For Psychological studies on this, see Kelly, “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief 
Polarization,” page 8. 
10 For more on this see, Dennett, Daniel Clement. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the 
Meanings of Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print. 
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III. Further Implications of Belief Polarization 
 
If we take the implications of Belief Polarization out of the context of apparent 
disagreement, we can reveal the further extent of this phenomenon. Specifically, let us 
look into the effects that Belief Polarization has on belief forming processes. We will 
start by isolating and defining the underlying process of Belief Polarization as follows:  
 
The Principle of Belief Polarization:  
The existence and nature of prior beliefs tends to cause subjects to 
disproportionately assess evidence in favor of their prior beliefs.  
 
Now take for example a rational subject, like a juror, who does not necessarily hold a 
firm prior belief about some specific issue (in the jurors case, presumably the 
innocence/wrongdoing of the person on trial) and is then presented with a mixed body 
of evidence that supports opposing views on said issue. Now, going back to Kelly’s 
example, it seems natural that when given a mixed body of evidence, disagreeing 
subjects would equally reflect on all of the evidence and (at least) narrow their 
respective gap. Yet, as we now know, the opposite seems to be true in this case, where 
disagreeing subjects tend to become more polarized. However, does Belief Polarization 
affect our evidence gathering processes when we have no significant prior beliefs 
weighing on an issue? Moreover, can Belief Polarization affect us when there is no 
apparent disagreement? It appears at first glance that, because of the isolated 
circumstances of the subject, evidence gathering and, more importantly, belief forming 
processes would naturally remain unadulterated.  
 
Yet, contrary to intuition, Principle of Belief Polarization seems to in fact affect these 
scenarios. The significance of Belief Polarization in these cases becomes evident by a 
closer look at the formation of initial beliefs. There are two factors to consider about 
the formation of initial beliefs in this case: one being the order by which the evidence is 
presented and the other being the presentation of the evidence itself. The latter factor 
seems to be more apparent as to how it can affect formation of initial beliefs, as we 
might tend to believe evidence presented by a certified official, like a doctor, rather 
than a random person on the street. As Kelly puts it, “It is uncontroversial that there are 
some circumstances in which one should give considerable weight to the judgments of 
another party in deciding what to believe about a given question.”11  
 
The other factor, the order by which evidence is presented, should naturally affect 
formation of initial beliefs in our subject based solely on the reasonable view that 
beliefs should be formed as soon as the subject feels he or she has gathered enough 
supporting evidence to substantiate some beliefs and not of others lacking substantial 
                                                          
11 Kelly, Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, page 9. 
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supporting evidence thus far presented.12 Likewise, as rational subjects, it seems that, 
by the end of our evaluation of the evidence presented, we should assess the different 
apparent beliefs appropriately as supported by the evidence given. It follows then that 
the presentation and order of evidence do not appear to be epistemically significant 
because of the nature of rational subjects.  
 
Yet, it appears that the Principle of Belief Polarization weighs on the neutral state of 
belief forming processes. As the principle suggests, beliefs tend to cause biases on 
evidence gathering as soon as they are formed. Consider the previous example during 
which our naïve rational subject assesses a substantial body of mixed evidence 
concerning an issue in hopes of forming a rational belief. Now given that we know 
rational subjects tend to form beliefs variably based on the order and presentation of 
evidence provided and that the biasing effects of the Principle of Belief Polarization 
manifest as soon as beliefs are formed, Belief Polarization will cause the subject to 
disproportionately evaluate evidence in favor of their new undeveloped beliefs. Hence, 
the order and presentation of evidence becomes epistemologically significant, as they 
now seem to prematurely bias our belief forming processes. So, contrary to natural 
expectations, our rational subject should be weary of his or her seemingly unbiased 
approach during belief forming processes. More broadly, this example should act to 
parallel similar real-world cases of the pervasiveness of Belief Polarization outside of 
apparent disagreement and show why we should be less confident in our belief forming 
processes.  
 
 
IV.  Possible Objections 
 
Consider the Uniqueness thesis: 
 
A body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of 
propositions and that it justifies at most one attitude toward any particular 
proposition.13 
 
The first objection to consider concerns the relevance and consequences of the 
Uniqueness thesis to the main argument of this paper14. As White points out, “…to the 
extent that we reject Uniqueness, it is hard to see why one’s convictions ought always 
to be responsive to confirming evidence.”15 So the question arises: does Uniqueness 
need to be true for Belief Polarization to present a problem? And if not, what 
                                                          
12 White, R. 2005. “Epistemic Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives 19. Page 449. 
13 Feldman Reasonable Religious Disagreements page 10. 
14 The argument being: given awareness of Belief Polarization, rational subjects should be less 
confident in their justification of belief forming processes. 
15 White, “Epistemic Permissiveness,” page 454. 
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significance does Uniqueness hold for or against the significance and implications of 
Belief Polarization? 
 
It should be noted that Uniqueness is a complicated position for many views in the 
epistemology of disagreement. White, Kelly, and Christensen all discuss and 
acknowledge the significance of Uniqueness, relative to the permissive, steadfast, and 
conciliatory views, as somewhat unclear.16 Yet, what does seem clear is that 
permissiveness necessarily denies Uniqueness by holding that epistemic norms are 
permissive norms (meaning that they are somewhat malleable), which allows for 
differing propositional beliefs.17 In contrast, Uniqueness supports conciliatory views, 
according to which subjects should be less confident in their own beliefs in the face of 
disagreement.18 
 
Although conciliationism and the thesis of this paper both argue that subjects should be 
less confident in their beliefs, they differ in that conciliationism relies on disagreement 
as the limiting factor of beliefs whereas the thesis of this paper relies on the effect of 
Belief Polarization on evidence gathering. In other words, conciliationism relies on the 
existence of one rational answer as the reason for losing confidence in beliefs whereas 
the thesis of this paper relies on the seemingly biased process of evidence gathering as 
reason to be less confident in beliefs. Therefore, the constraint of Uniqueness on 
conciliationism need not apply to the thesis of this paper.  
 
Yet, as a result, this distinction might lead one to believe that the argument of this paper 
adopts a steadfast view, one that embraces permissiveness19. While the thesis of this 
paper does in fact hold that two subjects can have rational and opposite views, it 
necessitates permissiveness due to the existence of biasing effects of Belief Polarization 
(and the Principle of Belief Polarization) and therefore does not hold that two 
individuals can necessarily be equally rationally opposed. Consequently, the thesis of 
this paper does not necessitate a steadfast view.  
 
Given these distinctions about the complex implications of the main argument of this 
paper, it appears that Uniqueness is not considerably relevant to this argument. For, in the 
case where Uniqueness is true, the Principle of Belief Polarization holds that the way one 
                                                          
16 White, “Epistemic Permissiveness,” page 446, Christensen, D. “Disagreement as Evidence: 
The Epistemology of Controversy” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), page 763, Kelly, T. 
“Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception” Philosophy Compass. Vol. 
3, No. 5. (September 2008): 933-955. 
17 Rosen, Gideon (2001), "Nominalism, Naturalism, Philosophical Relativism," Philosophical 
Perspectives, 15: 71-73. 
18 For more discussion on the relationship between conciliationism and Uniqueness and how 
conciliationism may not necessitate Uniqueness, see Christensen, page 763. However, for the 
sake of this argument the distinction is not necessary.  
19 Christensen, page 763. 
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could get to the unique attitude would be by biased methods, meaning that it would be 
somewhat by chance that one would ultimately hold a unique view20. Clearly, it would not 
be epistemically responsible to base unique beliefs on luck and therefore the existence of 
Uniqueness should not be relevant. Conversely, since the argument of this paper 
necessitates permissiveness, the falsity of Uniqueness should not affect its significance. 
Therefore, Uniqueness is not relevant to the impact of the thesis of this paper.  
 
A second objection is that some might think that this view leads to understanding our 
beliefs as arbitrary due to their biased nature. G.A. Cohen provides an example of 
relevance of this objection whereby he describes the opposing beliefs of graduates of 
Oxford and Harvard. Cohen notes that he and other Oxford graduates of his generation 
tend to believe in the analytic/synthetic distinction while Harvard graduates from the 
same generation do not.21 Now imagine that you are getting ready to apply to graduate 
school and your only two options are Harvard and Oxford and you understand that 
going to either school will affect how you view the Analytic/Synthetic distinction (and 
presumably other beliefs). Does this mean that your beliefs are caused arbitrarily by 
your choice of which school to go to?  
 
The answer, according to the thesis of this paper, is that your beliefs should not be 
arbitrarily affected by the choice of which school to go to but they may be. This 
distinction is due to the contingent claim of the thesis, that in order to be less confident 
in one’s justification one must be aware of Belief Polarization. Thus, given awareness 
of Belief Polarization we, as rational subjects, should understand and actively combat 
its biasing implications. Accordingly, in the graduate school example, the fact that you 
are aware of the effect that your choice of school may have on your future beliefs 
should cause you to be less confident in your justification of belief forming processes 
while you are at either school. Furthermore, you should work to combat the effects of 
either school on your belief forming processes by actively trying to assess evidence 
pertaining to these issues more carefully22. In doing so, you will limit the arbitrariness 
of your final beliefs. Conversely, it would be epistemologically irresponsible to ignore 
the biasing effect that these schools have on your belief forming processes and continue 
to hold the same level of confidence in your future beliefs. The paralleled implications 
between the awareness of Belief Polarization and awareness of the effects of school 
                                                          
20 For more on this see White’s ‘pill popping’ example in White, “Epistemic Permissiveness,” 
page 448. 
21 Cohen, G.A. (2000) “If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?” Harvard 
University Press. 
22 It is possible that the effects of these schools have on your belief forming processes are due to 
factors other than evidence gathering - like, say, there’s ‘something’ in the vegetables. However, 
this distinction does not pose a significant threat to the response of this objection, because as long 
as you are at least less confident in your final beliefs you are being more epistemically 
responsible than by ignoring the effects. Therefore, your actions can still limit the arbitrariness of 
this effect.   
Res Cogitans (2015) 6                                                                                                     Pennebaker | 100 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
choice in this example should point to the practicality and pervasiveness of the 
argument of this paper. This example highlights the epistemic responsibility that the 
argument of this paper entails and provides ways for us to actively respond to the 
biasing effects of the phenomenon Belief Polarization.  
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Now that we understand the mechanisms and implications of Belief Polarization what 
does it all mean? How should we go about responding to these claims?  
 
This paper is meant to provide a different understanding of the biasing processes of 
evidence gathering and belief formation and to promote progressive awareness of the 
responsibility that we, as rational subjects, have to combat these biases. In this paper we 
have extrapolated the direct and indirect implications of Belief Polarization (and the 
Principle of Belief Polarization) and have been given examples of the pervasiveness of 
these implications in evidence gathering and belief forming processes. Consequently, 
these implications appear to hold strong epistemological significance due to the biased 
nature of evidence gathering that threatens the notion that our belief forming processes 
are fairly justified.  
 
In going forth with responding to these findings we should be careful as to how we 
understand the validity and importance of holding our beliefs. As rational subjects we 
possess the ability to reassess our decisions and beliefs. Therefore, awareness of Belief 
Polarization should cause us to be weary of the objectivity of our beliefs and incite in 
us a heightened sense of rational awareness when gathering and assessing evidence, 
both in the face of disagreement and even when we are forming new beliefs. So it is 
important to note that the existence of Belief Polarization does not fully undermine our 
position as rational subjects and does not take away the full validity of our beliefs.  
 
The views argued for in this paper do not hold that we should abandon our beliefs; 
rather, we should be less confident in our justification of our beliefs and be more open 
to reassessment. So, in the face of disagreement we should be careful as to unfairly 
discount the others’ view. In turn, these responses should lead subjects to be more 
epistemically responsible and progressive.  
 
Broadly speaking, the biasing mechanisms of Belief Polarization may find to play a 
significant role in resistance to change in huge systems like scientific revolutions and 
paradigm shifts. Examples of this may include the aforementioned resistance to the 
discoveries of Newton, Darwin, and Einstein and paradigm shifts like the turn from 
Orientalism or political history. However speculative the effects of Belief Polarization on 
these systems may be there seems to be some inclination that widespread awareness of 
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Belief Polarization could lead to a more progressive society. Yet, individually speaking, 
the effects of awareness of Belief Polarization seem to be more reasonably promising.   
 
